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INTRODUCTION 
During the survey period, November 1, 1989 through October 
31, 1990, the Sixth Circuit considered a wide range of pro-
cedural issues. The most noteworthy decisions dealt with the 
determination of a corporation's and dual national's citizenship 
for diversity jurisdiction, the reach of Michigan's long-arm 
statute, selecting the appropriate Kentucky statute of limitations 
in a section 1983 civil rights action in the wake of two recent 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions on this subject, and whether 
contractual forum selection clauses' waive a party's right to 
remove. The Sixth Circuit also had occasion to reverse a district 
court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a 
conditional grant of a new trial in a case where the movant 
t Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. B.A. 1973, University of 
Michigan; J.D. 1977, Wayne State University School of Law; LL.M. 1982, Harvard 
Law School. 
HeinOnline -- 1991 Det. C.L. Rev. 524 1991
524 Detroit College of Law Review [2:523 
had failed to move for directed verdict at trial and where the 
jury had returned a verdict in favor of the non-moving party 
twice. Finally, the court, sitting en bane, ruled that use of the 
designation "et al." in a notice of appeal is insufficient to 
meet the requirements of a notice of appeal under Rule 3(c) 
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, in light of the 
Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger 
Co.' 
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
The Sixth Circuit issued two opinions dealing with the de-
termination of a party's citizenship for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction. The first decision addressed the question of a 
wholly-owned subsidiary's citizenship. The other examined the 
question of whether diversity jurisdiction can exist when an 
individual has dual national citizenship.2 
A. A Wholly-Owned Subsidiary's Principal Place of 
Business 
In Schwartz v. Electronic Data Systems, Inc. ,3 a former 
employee of defendant Electronic Data Systems (EDS) sought 
1. 487 u.s. 312 (1988). 
2. During the survey period the Sixth Circuit also resolved a pendent party 
jurisdiction issue in Stallworth v. City of Cleveland, 893 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1990). 
In that case, a husband and wife brought an action against the City of Cleveland. 
The wife sought damages for a violation of her civil rights under 42 U .S.C. § 
1983. The husband sought damages under state law for loss of consortium. Because 
there was no diversity between Mr. Stallworth and defendant, the court dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that no authority existed for exercising pendent 
party jurisdiction over the husband's state law claim. [d. at 838. However, one 
of the cases cited by the court in support, Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 
(1989), was expressly overruled by Congress in December 1990 when it added a 
new section to title 28, United States Code, entitled, "Supplemental Jurisdiction." 
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990), 
to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990). See H.R. REp. No. 734, 101st Cong., 
2d Sess. 27-29 (1990), reprinted in 1991 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6873-
75. Because jurisdiction was not founded solely on diversity jurisdiction in Stallworth, 
there is an argument that pendent party jurisdiction would now exist over Mr. 
Stallworth's loss of consortium claim under section 1367(a). Compare 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(b) (1988). This issue will undoubtedly be revisited by the Sixth Circuit in 
the future. 
3. 913 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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recovery of damages for breach of an employment contract 
and for alleged fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the 
content of a training program for which he was hired. Plaintiff 
invoked the court's diversity jurisdiction. Schwartz is a citizen 
of Michigan. While EDS is a Texas corporation with its principal 
place of business in Dallas, it is also a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation with 
its principal place of business in Michigan.4 The diversity statute 
provides that "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen 
of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the 
State where it has its principal place of business . . .. ' '5 Although 
the question was not raised below, 6 at oral argument the court 
requested the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing 
the question whether EDS should be treated as a separate entity 
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, or whether it should be 
treated as an alter ego of its corporate parent, General Motors.7 
The court announced the following guiding principle: 
When formal separation is maintained between a corporate parent 
and its corporate subsidiary, federal court jurisdiction over the 
subsidiary is determined by that corporation's citizenship, not the 
citizenship of the parent. So far as we can determine, every court 
of appeals that has considered the question has reached this 
conclusion. 8 
This rule applies even where the parent owns all the .stock 
of the subsidiary and exercises close control over its operations, 
the court added.9 Against this legal backdrop, the court found 
nothing in the record that would support a finding that EDS 
is not, formally, a separate corporation, although it is wholly-
owned by General Motors. tO 
4. [d. at 281. 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(I) (1988). 
6. See FED. R. CIY. P. 12(h)(3) (which states: "Whenever it appears by 
suggestion by the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, the court shall dismiss the action"). 
7. 913 F.2d at 282. 
8. [d. at 283. 
9. [d. 
10. [d. at 284. 
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Chief Judge Merritt filed a lengthy dissenting OpInIOn on 
this point. 11 He found that resort to corporation law on the 
relationship between parent and subsidiary was totally misplaced 
in the context of jurisdictional inquiries. 12 Unlike the majority, 
he would have found all of General Motor's wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, such as EDS, to be Michigan corporations, as 
well as citizens of the state in which they are incorporated 
and in which they have their principal place of business.13 
Consequently, under Chief Judge Merritt's view, because 
Schwartz is a citizen of Michigan, diversity jurisdiction would 
not exist in this case. Finding an absence of clear congressional 
expression on this point, Chief Judge Merritt noted that one 
of the chief reasons for giving corporations dual citizenship 
in 1958 was to reduce the case load of the federal courts in 
diversity cases. 14 He added that if the sole purpose of diversity 
jurisdiction is to provide a forum free from prejudice against 
outsiders, "then no reason recommends viewing a business that 
is wholly owned by a local business as any less 'local' than 
its owner."IS With an eye to these legislative goals, Chief Judge 
Merritt concluded that it would frustrate Congress's intent to 
read the diversity statute in such a way as to permit jurisdiction 
under these circumstances. 16 
Chief Judge Merritt's views are commendable, but it will 
take either an act of Congress or a Supreme Court reversal 
to alter this legal landscape. Indeed, proposals have been made 
in this very connection to whittle down diversity jurisdiction 
even more by deeming corporations engaged in multistate 
activities to be citizens of every state in which they do business. 17 
Nevertheless, in the absence of a clear expression by Congress 
or the Supreme Court to the contrary, the majority cannot be 
faulted for concluding that General Motor's Michigan citizenship 
11. Schwartz v. EDS, Inc., 913 F.2d 279, 286-94 (6th Cir. 1990) (Merritt, 
C.J., dissenting). 
12. [d. at 286. 
13. [d. at 286-87. 
14. [d. at 289. 
15. [d. at 290. 
16. [d. at 291. 
17. See Joiner, Corporations As Citizens of Every State Where They Do 
Business: A Needed Change in Diversity Jurisdiction, 70 JUDICATURE 291 (1987). 
HeinOnline -- 1991 Det. C.L. Rev. 527 1991
1991] Civil Procedure 527 
is not to be attributed to its wholly-owned subsidiary, EDS. 
B. Individuals With Dual Citizenship and Diversity 
Jurisdiction 
What is the citizenship, for diversity purposes, of a party 
with dual national citizenship? This was the question raised, 
but left unanswered, in Von Dunser v. Aronoff.ls According 
to the pleadings, the plaintiff is an Austrian-born, naturalized 
U.S. citizen, and the defendant is a Michigan citizen. 19 After 
Von Dunser won a $727,170 judgment, Aronoff, for the first 
time on appeal, made his jurisdictional challenge. Aronoff 
claimed that, first, Von Dunser could not invoke alienage 
jurisdiction because he is a naturalized U.S. citizen, and that 
as an American citizen with no state domicile (Von Dunser 
lives in Europe), Von Dunser had no state citizenship and, 
consequently, there was no diversity jurisdiction.20 Aronoff's 
alternative contention was that Von Dunser was a citizen of 
Florida at the time of the filing of the complaint, and so was 
Aronoff. Therefore, no diversity existed when the complaint 
was filed, the critical time inquiry in cases invoking diversity 
jurisdiction.21 
Because none of these arguments were raised below, and 
because they entailed fact finding, the Sixth Circuit remanded. 
The court noted that the dual citizen has been "a troublesome 
creature for the courts in construing the diversity and alienage 
statute. "22 Considering that the policy for alienage jurisdiction 
is to avoid the danger of giving offense to foreign nations by 
denying their nationals a federal forum in suits against U.S. 
citizens, that policy would not be frustrated in a case such as 
this where the plaintiff is a naturalized U.S. citizen.23 
Nevertheless, the court refrained from expressly adopting or 
18. 915 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1990). 
19. [d. at 1072. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. at 1072-73. 
22. [d. at 1073. 
23. [d. at 1073-74 (citing Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176 (7th CiT. 1980». 
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rejecting this position, ostensibly because of the unsettled factual 
record.24 
In its remand to the district court, the Sixth Circuit 
acknowledged that the district court was not to be faulted for 
the state of record on appeal. It had had no occasion to make 
factual findings regarding jurisdiction because this issue was 
not contested by the parties.25 The court nonetheless made the 
"suggestion" that "because the federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction, it would be helpful if district courts made 
findings of fact on the predicates of subject-matter jurisdiction 
even where they appear unnecessary. "26 The court also gave 
the district court an open invitation to impose Rule 11 sanctions 
on one or the other party, depending on the court's ultimate 
findings. 27 
Although the Sixth Circuit refrained from explicitly adopting 
the Seventh Circuit's holding in Sadat v. MertesZ8 that no 
alienage jurisdiction exists where a party is a dual citizen of 
the United States and another country, the court came close 
to doing just that in its remand order. It was undisputed that 
Von Dunser is an Austrian national and also a naturalized 
American. A remand for fact finding regarding Aronoff's or 
Von Dunser's domicile in Florida is superfluous if Von Dunser 
is considered an Austrian. In that case, alienage jurisdiction 
exists. 
Adoption of the Seventh Circuit's Sadat rationale, namely, 
that fears of perceived discrimination against aliens vanishes 
once that alien becomes a U.S. citizen, and thus no alienage 
jurisdiction exists in those circumstances, makes eminent good 
sense. What makes little sense, however, is the court's suggestion, 
which comes close to a direction, to the district courts to 
conduct arguably wasteful and unnecessary fact finding on 
jurisdiction in cases where it is not contested. While it is 
24. [d. at 1074. Elsewhere in the opinion, the court stated that even though 
Von Dunser's complaint alleges dual citizenship, "under Sadat v. Mertes, dual 
citizenship does not create alienage jurisdiction." [d. at 1075. The court thus comes 
very close to following Sadat. 
25. [d. at 1075. 
26. [d. at 1076. 
27. [d. n.4. 
28. 615 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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unfortunate that constitutional limits on federal court subject 
matter jurisdiction allow a losing party to contest that jurisdiction 
for the first time on appeal, unless such eleventh-hour challenges 
are commonplace, the cure seems worse than the malady. The 
district courts can wield the club of Rule 11 sanctions to deter 
and punish abuses. 
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
In two cases focusing on issues of personal jurisdiction, the 
Sixth Circuit took up the questions of the reach of the Michigan 
long-arm statute and whether a non-resident defendant had 
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to render it 
amenable to jurisdiction there. 
A. The Reach of a State's Long-Arm Statute 
In Michigan National Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc. ,29 the 
plaintiff Michigan National Bank was the assignee of contract 
claims against the non-resident corporate defendants. The Bank 
sued the defendants to recover on those contract claims, but 
the district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 30 
The district court rejected both of the Bank's arguments that 
the court had jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants, 
under either of Michigan's long-arm statutes, one providing 
for general personal jurisdiction over corporate defendants, the 
other providing for specific or limited personal jurisdiction.31 
The Bank brought suit to recover the purchase price of machinery 
used in the manufacture of furniture and delivered to the 
defendants in Alabama, their principal place of business. 
Although the defendants had business contacts with Michigan, 
those contacts did not give rise directly to the instant lawsuitY 
The Bank maintained that the defendants conducted a 
"continuous and systematic part of their general business" in 
Michigan, thus subjecting them to general personal jurisdiction 
29. 888 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1989). 
30. [d. at 464. 
31. [d. at 463. The two statutes are MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 600.711 and 
600.715(1) (West 1990). 
32. 888 F.2d at 463-64. 
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in the state,33 i.e., to suits in Michigan unrelated to their 
contacts with Michigan .34 Section 600.711 (3) provides: 
Corporations; general personal jurisdiction Sec. 711. The existence 
of any of the following relationships between a corporation and 
the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable 
the courts of record of this state to exercise general personal 
jurisdiction over the corporation and to enable such courts to render 
personal judgments against the corporation. 
(3) The carrying on of a continuous and systematic part of its 
general business within the state. 3' 
Thus, for example, invoking general personal jurisdiction, 
General Motors would be amenable to suit in Michigan for 
any claim brought against it arising anywhere in the world 
because Michigan is General Motors' headquarters. 
In reversing the district court's determination that the 
defendants did not maintain continuous and systematic contacts 
with Michigan, the Sixth Circuit cited three factors in support 
of its conclusion that such contacts did exist: (1) they retain 
an independent sales representative in Michigan; (2) they conduct 
mail order solicitations of Michigan businesses; and (3) they 
made over 400 sales totaling $625,000 in 1986 and 1987 in the 
state. 36 These factors were sufficient for the court to conclude 
that the defendants' contacts with Michigan were "continuous 
and systematic, "37 thus rendering them amenable to suit in 
Michigan for claims not arising out of those Michigan contacts, 
33. [d. at 464. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 
U.S. 408 (1984), where the Supreme Court explained: "It has been said that when 
a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or 
related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State is exercising 'specific 
jurisdiction' over the defendant." [d. at 414 n.8 (citations omitted). The Supreme 
Court further explained that "[w]hen a State exercises personal jurisdiction over 
a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with 
the forum. the State has been said to be exercising 'general jurisdiction' over the 
defendant." [d. n.9 (citations omitted). 
34. The phrase, "continuous and systematic part of its business." is drawn 
from the U.S. Supreme Court watershed decision, International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington. 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). 
35. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.711(3) (West 1990). 
36. 888 F .2d at 466. 
37. [d. at 466-67. 
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simultaneously satisfying the Michigan long-arm statute and 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
Viewing this case as an unadorned exercise in statutory 
construction, the facts fit easily within the reach of the statute. 
Under Michigan case law, the linchpin for general personal 
jurisdiction under section 600.711(3) is corporate presence either 
in fact or through an independent agent.38 Because the Michigan 
long-arm statute incorporates the term "continuous and 
systematic,' '39 a phrase used extensively by the Supreme Court 
in its personal jurisdiction decisions,40 analyzing this statute 
under the due process clause was a straightforward proposition. 
As applied to the facts of this case, again, the statute clearly 
passes constitutional muster under the leading Supreme Court 
general personal jurisdiction cases. 41 
B. Minimum Contacts With the Forum State 
Does a foreign bank that issues a letter of credit naming a 
Michigan resident as a beneficiary have sufficient mInImUm 
contacts with Michigan to support the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over it? To this question, the Sixth Circuit answered 
"no" in Chandler v. Barc/ays Bank PLC.42 Defendant Banque 
du Caire, an Egyptian bank, issued a letter of credit at the 
request of International Steel in favor of the plaintiff Chandler. 43 
International Steel is also an Egyptian company and the buyer 
of steel products from the plaintiff Chandler in Michigan. 
After presentation of documents in New Yark to Barclays, the 
confirming bank, payment against the letter of credit was 
declined because of discrepancies in the documents. Banque 
du Caire also advised Barclays not to pay because of the 
discrepancies in the documentation. 44 Chandler thereafter 
38. Kircos v. Lola Cars Ltd., 97 Mich. App. 379, 386, 296 N.W.2d 32, 35 
(1980). 
39. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.711 (West 1990). 
40. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). 
41. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) 
(dictum); Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
42. 898 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1990). 
43. [d. at 1150. 
44. [d. 
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brought a diversity action to recover against the letter of credit. 
The district court dismissed his complaint against Banque du 
Caire for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Relying on decisions from the 
Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, holding that the mere issuance 
of a letter of credit naming a resident of a particular state as 
beneficiary does not subject the issuing bank to the jurisdiction 
of that state,4S the court rejected Chandler's contention that 
Banque du Caire had the requisite minimum contacts with 
Michigan.46 Under the Supreme Court's "purposeful availment" 
test, first announced in Hanson v. Denckla,47 the court disagreed 
with Chandler that Banque du Caire had "purposefully availed 
itself of the privilege of acting or causing a consequence to 
occur in Michigan."48 The other federal courts which have 
analyzed the issuance of letters of credit as a jurisdictional 
hook have reached a uniform conclusion that standing alone 
this is not sufficient,49 observing that the issuing bank's 
obligation under the letter of credit is independent of the 
underlying sales contract. so 
Chandler next advanced a national contacts argument, arguing 
that the district court had jurisdiction over Banque du Caire 
based on its contacts with the United States as a whole. This 
argument was unavailing, however, in the absence of a federal 
long-arm statute.S1 This case being a diversity action, the district 
45. Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1982); H. Ray Baker, 
Inc. v. Associated Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
832 (1979); Empire Abrasive Equipment Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 
554 (3d Cir. 1977). 
46. 898 F.2d at 1151. 
47. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
48. 898 F.2d at 1151. 
49. See cases cited supra note 45. Contra Van Schaack & Co. v. District 
Court, 189 Colo. 145, 538 P.2d 425 (1975). 
50. 898 F.2d at 1153. 
51. The two federal courts of appeals that have considered this very question 
have also rejected it in the absence of some statutory authorization. [d. at 1154 
(citing Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 980 (1985); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 
406 (9th Cir. 1977». 
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court had to rely solely on the Michigan long-arm statute to 
secure personal jurisdiction over the defendant. S2 The 
constitutional reach of the state long-arm statute being, of 
course, limited to state contacts, the Sixth Circuit rejected this 
argument as well.s3 
Although the minimum contacts test has been buffeted by 
recent Supreme Court decisions,s4 if the test has any continuing 
efficacy as a genuine limit on a court's jurisdiction it has to 
be in cases such as Chandler where the defendant's forum 
contacts are so attenuated as to approach the vanishing point. 
Arguably, the minimum contacts test should be jettisoned 
altogether in favor of some broad "reasonableness" test which 
would resemble, if not mirror, the law of forum non conveniens. 
But such a shift in the law will have to await action by either 
Congress or the Supreme Court. 
III. CHOICE-OF-FoRUM CLAUSES AND W AlVINO 
THE RIGHT TO REMOVE 
During the survey period, the Sixth Circuit issued two op-
inions involving choice-of-forum clauses. The same two issues 
were presented in both cases: (1) Does a forum selection clause 
constitute a waiver of the right to remove the action from 
state court to federal court? (2) Does an order of remand to 
the state court on the basis of the forum selection clause result 
in an appealable order? To the first issue, the court answered 
"no." To the second issue, the court answered "yes." 
In Regis Associates v. Rank Hotels (Management) Ltd.,sS 
Regis terminated a hotel management agreement it had with 
Rank and filed an action in Wayne County Circuit Court. 
52. Omni Capital International v. Rudolph Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987). 
The Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question whether a national contacts 
test is constitutional under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.· (1987). 
53. 898 F.2d at 1154. The court also rejected Chandler's contention that Barclays 
was Banque du Caire's agent, thus rendering Banque du Caire amenable to suit 
in Michigan. [d. at 1154-55. The court concluded that Barclays assumed an in-
dependent contractual relationship with Chandler as the confirming bank, and thus 
there was no agency between it and Banque du Caire. [d. at 1155. 
54. E.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (transient ju-
risdiction over defendant physically present in the state at the time of service) 
(plurality); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
55. 894 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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Rank in turn filed a removal petition in district court, which 
triggered a motion to remand by Regis. S6 Regis argued that 
the parties' choice-of-forum clause in their management agree-
ment constituted a waiver of the right to remove under 28 
V.S.C. § 1441, the federal removal statute. That clause pro-
vided: "The interpretation and application of this Agreement 
shall be governed by the law of the State of Michigan and 
the parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the Michigan 
Courts."S7 
The district court granted Regis' motion to remand. s8 On 
appeal, Regis' initial argument was that the court lacked ju-
risdiction to entertain an appeal from an order of remand. 59 
Its argument rested on 28 V.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides 
in part that "[a]n order remanding a case to the state court 
. . . is not reviewable on appeal . . .. ' '60 The court agreed 
that the language of section 1447(d) was broad, but quickly 
added that it has been given a narrowing construction by the 
Supreme Court in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdor-
jer,61 where the Supreme Court stated: 
Section 1447(d) is not dispositive of the reviewability of remand 
orders in and of itself. That section and § 1447(c) must be construed 
together . . . . This means that only remand orders issued under 
§ 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein-that removal 
was improvident and without jurisdiction-are immune from review 
under § 1447(d).62 
Agreeing with decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuits,63 
which have concluded that a remand order based on a district 
court's interpretation of a forum selection clause is reviewable 
on appeal, the Sixth Circuit denied Regis' motion to dismiss 
the appeal. 64 
56. [d. at 194. 
57. [d. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. 
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1990). 
61. 423 U.S. 336 (1976). 
62. [d. at 345-46. 
63. Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Center Dev. Corp., 838 
F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1988); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 
741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984). 
64. 894 F.2d at 195. 
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Turning to the forum selection clause issue, the court stated 
that "[a]lthough the right to remove can be waived, the case 
law makes it clear that such waiver must be clear and une-
quivocal. . . . [I]t is the waiver of a statutory right that must 
be set forth, not the intent to rely on the statute. "65 Since the 
parties' clause did not expressly waive the right to remove, 
the court concluded, it had not been waived. 66 
In the second case, In re Delta America Re Insurance Co. ,67 
the district court remanded an action to the state court on 
the basis of a forum selection clause in the parties' contract 
which provided: 
It is agreed that in the event of the failure of the Reinsurers hereon 
to pay any amount claimed to be due hereunder, the Reinsurers 
hereon, at the request of the Elkhorn will submit to the jurisdiction 
of any court of competent jurisdiction within the United States 
and will comply with all requirements necessary to give such Court 
jurisdiction and all matters arising hereunder shall be determined 
in accordance with the law and practice of such Court.68 
Addressing the threshold question of the appealability of the 
remand order, the court concluded that, notwithstanding the 
district court's statement in the order of remand that "[t]his 
is not an appealable order," the appeal was properly before 
it, citing its earlier Regis decision as controlling.69 Turning its 
attention to the waiver issue, the Sixth Circuit observed that 
in this case the controlling statute on the question of waiver 
of the right to remove was 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), giving foreign 
states or instrumentalities the absolute right to remove to federal 
court. It was uncontested that the petitioning defendant was 
a foreign sovereign as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Im-
65. Id. 
66. Id. The court noted at the end of its opinion that this matter was a tempest 
in a teapot because the same Michigan law would be applied to resolve the parties' 
dispute, regardless of whether the case was tried in state or federal court. But 
because some litigants perceive a "home court" advantage in litigating in state 
court, this is one reason why diversity jurisdiction exists. Id. at 196. 
67. 900 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 233 (1990). 
68. See In re Delta America Re Insurers Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 890, 892 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 733 (1990). 
69. 900 F.2d at 892. 
HeinOnline -- 1991 Det. C.L. Rev. 536 1991
536 Detroit College of Law Review [2:523 
munity Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603.70 Although the foreign sovereign 
could waive its right to remove, the Sixth Circuit could see 
little advantage to the foreign state in doing SO.71 The court 
adopted a bright line test for determining whether such a waiver 
has been made: 
In order to provide maximum guidance for future cases involving 
foreign states, we hold that any claimed waiver of the right of 
removal stemming from contractual language must be explicit. It 
is easy enough to provide that, if a state court is selected as a 
forum, no right of removal attaches. There is no reason why courts 
should have to wrestle with these interpretative questions when the 
contracting parties can easily deal with the problem themselves. A 
bright line test will serve the parties as well as judicial economy.72 
The court borrowed a page from its Regis decision and 
arrived at a simple test to apply when questions of waiver of 
the right to remove are presented. The parties are free to draft 
contract language which will remove doubts and ambiguities 
on the waiver question. Although the court qualified this bright 
line test as being applicable in "future cases involving foreign 
states, ''73 juxtaposing this decision with the language in Regis 
that a waiver of the right to remove must be clear and un-
equivocal,74 one can reasonably conclude that the same bright 
line test will apply regardless of the party's status as a foreign 
sovereign. 
IV. SELECTION OF THE APPROPRIATE STATE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS IN FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION 
Following disciplinary measures taken against her after she 
attempted to stop what she considered to be an illegal abortion, 
the plaintiff, a nurse, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.75 The action was filed nearly three years after the final 
disciplinary decision was made. Collard maintained that the 
70. See id. at 891. 
71. [d. at 893. 
72. [d. at 894 (footnotes omitted). 
73. [d. 
74. Regis Associates v. Rank Hotel (Mgt.) Ltd., 894 F.2d 193, 195 (6th Cir. 
1990). 
75. Collard v. Kentucky Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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applicable statute of limitations was Kentucky's five-year statute 
of limitations for "an action for an injury to the rights of 
the plaintiff not arising on contract and not otherwise enu-
merated. "76 The Sixth Circuit disagreed, finding that Kentucky's 
one-year general statute of limitations for personal injury gov-
erned." Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's 
dismissal based on the running of the statute of limitations. 
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by noting that because 
Congress has never legislated a statute of limitations in section 
1983 actions, the courts are required to look to analogous state 
statutes of limitation under the congressional direction of 42 
U.S.C. § 1988.'8 Because of the considerable confusion gen-
erated by Congress's referral to state law, the Supreme Court 
attempted to achieve some predictability in this area in Wilson 
v. Garcia.79 In that decision, the Supreme Court directed the 
lower federal courts to apply only one statute in each state 
and that, in looking for the one applicable statute, section 
1983 claims are to be characterized as personal injury actions.SO 
Since states had different limitations periods for bringing 
personal injury actions, nationwide uniformity was not possible 
even after Wilson, but matters were even more unsettled because 
many states had more than one statute of limitations governing 
personal injury actions. As a consequence, the Supreme Court 
revisited this issue in Owens v. Okure.S1 There, the Supreme 
Court observed that although a given state may have many 
limitations periods for personal injury actions, every state has 
a general or residual limitations period for personal injury 
actions.s2 The Supreme Court held that where a state has 
multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, it 
is the residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions 
that is to apply in section 1983 actions. 83 
76. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.120(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill supp. 1990). See 
Collard. 896 F.2d at 181. 
77. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.14O(I)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill supp. 1990). 
See Collard. 896 F.2d at 182. 
78. [d. at 180. 
79. 471 U.S. 261 (1985). 
80. [d. at 280. 
81. 488 U.S. 235 (1989). 
82. [d. at 245. 
83. [d. at 249-50. 
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The Sixth Circuit was able to quickly reach the conclusion 
that, because Kentucky did not have multiple statutes of lim-
itations for personal injury actions, Kentucky's one-year general 
personal injury statute of limitations was the applicable lim-
itations period.84 In the interests of uniformity and simplicity, 
the Supreme Court settled on "personal injury" statutes, rather 
than "personal rights" statutes, as the benchmark.8s Conceding 
that Collard would have had a good argument that the five-
year limitations statute for injury to the rights of a person 
was applicable had the Wilson and Owens cases not been 
decided, the fact remained that those two cases led the Sixth 
Circuit inexorably to the conclusion that Collard's section 1983 
action was time barred. 
It seems regrettable that a party's ability to enforce a federal 
right will vary from state to state depending on the state's 
applicable statute of limitations. In the four states comprising 
the Sixth Circuit, for example, the limitations period for section 
1983 actions is three years in Michigan, two years in Ohio, 
and one year in Kentucky and Tennessee.86 The Sixth Circuit 
did not view this disparity as desirable, but recognized that 
"the answer to the problem lies with Congress adopting a 
statute of limitations for federal civil rights actions. "87 This 
very proposal came before the 101st Congress, which took a 
middle course. In December 1990, Congress enacted a general 
four-year statute of limitations for actions brought to enforce 
rights created by any federal statute enacted after December 
1990. Although it was proposed to make the new limitations 
statute retroactive, concerns were voiced that settled expecta-
tions of parties to former litigation might be disturbed by such 
an enactment. Consequently, the new federal limitations period 
was made prospective only. Unfortunately, hopes for nation-
wide uniformity in section 1983 actions were dashed. 
V. JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
AND NEW TRIAL 
In Portage II v. Bryant Petroleum Corp., 88 two limited 
partnerships created to invest in oil and gas wells brought an 
84. 896 F.2d at 181-82. 
85. [d. at 182. 
86. See id. at 183 0.4. 
87. [d. 
88. 899 F.2d 1514 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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action against several defendants alleging negligence and se-
curities fraud in connection with information furnished plain-
tiffs about drilling sites.89 The only remaining defendant at the 
time of trial was Simm, a petroleum engineer who prepared 
reports and projections on the commercial amount of gas and 
oil recoverable at selected sites.90 At the close of all proofs, 
the district court prepared interrogatories for the jury which 
asked its members to assess the relative percentage of negligence 
committed by plaintiffs and defendant Simm. Under the ap-
plicable Ohio law, comparative negligence had to be assessed 
between the parties.91 Counsel were never informed of the 
court's decision to use interrogatories, nor were they furnished 
with a copy of them even after their use came to light.92 With 
regard to the first three well sites, the jury found plaintiffs 
more than fifty percent negligent, precluding their recovery for 
negligent misrepresentation. However, with regard to the next 
four well sites, the jury found defendant Simm more than 
fifty percent negligent. The district court thought the jury might 
be confused, so he returned it to the jury room for further 
deliberations.93 Once again, the jury answered the interrogatory 
by stating that Simm was more than fifty percent negligent 
(on the first verdict, Simm was found eighty-two percent neg-
ligent; after further deliberations,. Simm was found to be sixty-
four percent negligent).94 
During the course of the trial, Simm never moved for directed 
verdict. After the verdict, he moved "to dismiss all claims 
asserted against him or, alternatively, to grant a new trial. "95 
The district court· entered judgment in favor of Simm, and in 
the alternative granted a new trial on the issue of negligent 
misrepresentation. 96 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and directed the district 
court to reinstate the jury's second verdict.97 Noting the dif-
89. [d. at 1517. 
90. [d. 1516-17. 
91. [d. at 1517. 
92. [d. at 1518. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. 
95. [d. at 1519. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 1526. 
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ferences among a general verdict, a general verdict with in-
terrogatories, and a special verdict (all provided for in Rule 
49), the court concluded that the district court had used a 
general verdict with interrogatories, but had done so in an 
improper manner.98 First, the district court failed to apprise 
counsel of its intention to use interrogatories with the jury 
and to give its members an opportunity to comment on their 
form. That was error.99 More importantly, the Sixth Circuit 
determined that regardless of whether the device used was a 
general verdict with interrogatories or a special verdict, the 
result should have been the same. 1OO The district court imper-
missibly ignored the interrogatory answers, contrary to all the 
evidence presented at trial that Simm was liable for negligent 
misrepresentation regarding the profitability of certain wells. 101 
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court's grant 
of Simm's motion to dismiss was tantamount to granting Simm 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 102 It is black letter law 
that judgment notwithstanding the verdict cannot be granted 
unless the party has moved for directed verdict. 103 A party 
who has failed to move for directed verdict at the close of 
all the evidence can neither ask the district court to rule on 
the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict for 
his opponent nor raise the question on appeaJ.104 Because Simm 
made no motion for directed verdict, the court found as a 
matter of law that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
jury's verdict. lOs 
98. [d. at 1524. 
99. [d. at 1521. 
100. [d. at 1521-22. 
101. [d. at 1522. 
102. [d. at 1523. 
103. FED. R. CJv. P. 50(b). 
104. 899 F.2d at 1522. The reason for this rule is that a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict was not known at common law. Concerns were thus raised that granting 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict would be in violation of the seventh amendment 
right to a jury trial. To resolve this dilemma, the Supreme Court in Galloway v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1942), concluded that a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict was nothing more than a delayed motion for directed 
verdict, a procedural control over the jury known at common law. In order to 
complete the legal fiction, however, a necessary precondition to filing one's "de-
layed" motion for directed verdict was to first file a motion for directed verdict 
before the case was submitted to the jury. 
105. [d. at 1523. 
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Finally, turning to the district court's conditional grant of 
a new trial, the court reminded Simm that "courts are not 
free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict 
merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences 
or conclusions . . . ." 106 Because the case turned largely on 
credibility resolutions, the great province of the jury, the court 
concluded that the jury carried out its function by not finding 
Simm as credible as the district court deemed. 107 Moreover, 
the district court's failure to state a basis for conditionally 
granting the new trial provided an additional reason for refusing 
to grant one on remand. los Rule 50(c) specifically directs the 
district court to state the basis for conditionally granting or 
denying the motion for a new trial. Finally, considering that 
two verdicts had been rendered on the same facts in favor of 
the same party, it would be rare indeed to grant a new trial 
under such circumstances. 109 
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Portage II serves as a reminder 
that the failure to move for directed verdict is fatal to a post-
verdict motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Port-
age II is also a reminder that although such a failure will not 
be fatal to a post-verdict motion for a new trial, the district 
court is not free simply to substitute its view of the evidence 
for that of the jury, especially where the same jury has returned 
a verdict in favor of the same party twice. 
VI. NOTICE OF APPEAL 
In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 110 the Supreme Court 
held that a notice of appeal using the phrase "et al." failed 
to designate an appealing party and, as a consequence, did 
not confer jurisdiction over the party whose name was not 
expressly included in the notice. The Supreme Court explained: 
The purpose of the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c) is to provide 
notice both to the opposition and to the court of the identity of 
the appellant or appellants. The use of the phrase "et al.," which 
106. [d. (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944». 
107. [d. at 1524. 
108. [d. 
109. [d. at 1524-25. 
110. 487 U.S. 312 (1988). 
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literally means "and others," utterly fails to provide such notice 
to either intended recipient. Permitting such vague designation would 
leave the appellee and the court unable to determine with certitude 
whether a losing party not named in the notice of appeal should 
be bound by an adverse judgment or held liable for costs or 
sanctions. The specificity requirement of Rule 3(c) is met only by 
some designation that gives fair notice of the specific individual 
or entity seeking to appeal. III 
Although the failure to name the party was unquestionably 
the result of clerical error in Torres, this did not deter the 
Supreme Court from concluding that Rule 3(c) of the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure was not satisfied. The Supreme 
Court thus considers certain rules' 'sufficiently critical in avoid-
ing inconsistency, vagueness, and unnecessary multiplication of 
litigation to warrant strict obedience even though application 
of the rules may have harsh results in certain circumstances." 112 
Rule 3(c) is such a rule. 
In Minority Employees of the Tennessee Department of 
Employment Security, Inc. v. Tennessee Department 0/ Em-
ployment Security, 113 the Sixth Circuit sat en banc to review 
three panel decisions involving the question of whether juris-
diction was lacking over the purported appeals of individual 
plaintiffs because the notice of appeal failed to name them.l l4 
All three panels dismissed the appeal of the unnamed plain-
tiffs. IIS Because of an apparent conflict between those panel 
decisions and the Sixth Circuit's 1989 decision in Ford v. 
Nicks,1I6 the court voted to rehear the three panel decisions 
Ill. [d. at 318. 
112. Minority Employees v. Tennessee Dep't. of Employment Sec., 901 F.2d 
1327 (6th Cir.) (en banc) , cert. denied, III S. Ct. 210 (1990). . 
113. 901 F.2d 1327 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990). 
114. [d. at 1330. 
115. See id. 
116. 866 F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 1989). Ford v. Nicks was a well-intentioned, but 
arguably misguided, effort to soften the sharp edges of the Torres decision. In 
Ford v. Nicks, the court distinguished Torres and accepted a notice of appeal 
containing "et al." because in the body of the notice the appellants had used the 
definite article in "the defendants," thereby sufficiently designating the appealing 
parties. [d. at 869. 
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en bane. In light of the holding and spirit of Torres, the court 
affirmed the three panel decisions in all respects and overruled 
its Ford v. Nicks opinion.1l7 
In affirming the dismissal of the individual plaintiffs' appeals 
because of their failure to comply with a concededly technical 
rule, the court acknowledged the harsh result of such a decision 
and, therefore, sought to state as clearly as possible what 
constitutes a notice that complies with the rule in order to 
avoid or minimize such harshness in future cases.118 The Sixth 
Circuit offered the following guidance: 
Plainly, after Torres, the safest way of securing appeal is for 
the party or parties seeking to appeal to state in the body of the 
notice of appeal the name of each and every party taking the 
appeal. A certain element of risk must always attend anything less 
than literal compliance, particularly in light of the variety of out-
comes in this circuit and among the circuits. The careful litigant 
is put on notice to take particular care to avoid a danger we cannot 
protect against. 
Subject to that admonition, it would appear to us that there 
may be some departures from naming in the body of the notice 
that will not be found to be fatal. In the instant appeal, for 
example, where the corporate plaintiff was stated in the caption 
we conclude that the party was properly before the court although 
the body only referred to "plaintiffs. "119 
Thus, as long as the appellant's name appears on the face 
of the notice of appeal, the designation may fall within the 
language of Rule 3(c) that "[a]n appeal shall not be dismissed 
for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal. "120 
In a footnote, the court added the following: 
117. 901 F .2d at 1330. 
118. [d. at 1331. 
119. [d. at 1335 (footnote omitted). 
120. [d. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Nelson would have found the speci-
fication "plaintiffs in the above case" as the parties taking the appeal a sufficient 
designation under Rule 3(c). Minority Employees v. Tennessee Dep't. of Employment 
Sec., 901 F.2d 1327, 1348 (6th Cir.) (Nelson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 210 (1990). 
Judge Martin also dissented, arguing, first, that the designation "appellants" in 
the notice of appeal satisfies Rule 3(c), and, second, that the rule announced in 
Torres should be applied prospectively only. Minority Employees v. Tennessee 
Dep't. of Employment Sec., 901 F.2d 1327, 1348-49, 1351 (6th Cir.) (Martin, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990). 
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it is evident that the bench and bar continue to be plagued by 
confusion in the interpretation of the language of Fed. R. App. 
P. 3(c). Both the majority and the minority in this case believe 
that a revision in the rule might be beneficial, and we respectfully 
urge that consideration be given to a change. 121 
The Author seconds the court's motion . 
. 121. 901 F.2d at 1335 n.4. 
